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446 lines
13 KiB
446 lines
13 KiB
/* ocsp_vfy.c */
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2000.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2000-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <string.h>
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static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
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static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
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static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags);
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static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret);
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static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid, STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
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static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags);
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static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags);
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/* Verify a basic response message */
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int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer, *x;
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
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int i, ret = 0;
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ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, st, flags);
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if (!ret)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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goto end;
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}
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if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
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flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
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{
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EVP_PKEY *skey;
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skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
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ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey, 0);
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EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
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if(ret <= 0)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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goto end;
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}
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}
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if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
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{
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int init_res;
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if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
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init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, NULL);
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else
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init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, st, signer, bs->certs);
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if(!init_res)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
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goto end;
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}
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
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ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
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chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
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X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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if (ret <= 0)
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{
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i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
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X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
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goto end;
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}
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if(flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS)
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{
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ret = 1;
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goto end;
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}
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/* At this point we have a valid certificate chain
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* need to verify it against the OCSP issuer criteria.
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*/
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ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain, flags);
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/* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
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if (ret != 0) goto end;
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/* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and
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* check for explicit trust
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*/
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if(flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) goto end;
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x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
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if(X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_BASIC_VERIFY,OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
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goto end;
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}
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ret = 1;
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}
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end:
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if(chain) sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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OCSP_RESPID *rid = bs->tbsResponseData->responderId;
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if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)))
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{
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*psigner = signer;
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return 2;
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}
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if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) &&
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(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid)))
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{
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*psigner = signer;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
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*psigner = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
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{
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int i;
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unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
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X509 *x;
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/* Easy if lookup by name */
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if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
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return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
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/* Lookup by key hash */
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/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
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if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) return NULL;
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keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
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/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
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{
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL);
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if(!memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH))
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return x;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, unsigned long flags)
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{
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp;
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X509 *signer, *sca;
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OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
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int i;
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sresp = bs->tbsResponseData->responses;
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if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_ISSUER, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
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return -1;
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}
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/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
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i = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
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/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
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if (i <= 0) return i;
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signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
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if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1)
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{
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sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
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i = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
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if (i < 0) return i;
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if (i)
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{
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/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
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if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer, flags)) return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
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return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
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}
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/* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with the same
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* algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates against the issuer.
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* If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check equality against one of them.
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*/
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static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
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{
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OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
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int i, idcount;
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idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
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if (idcount <= 0)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_IDS, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
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return -1;
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}
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cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
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*ret = NULL;
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for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++)
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{
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tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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/* Check to see if IDs match */
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if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid))
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{
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/* If algoritm mismatch let caller deal with it */
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if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm,
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cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm))
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return 2;
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/* Else mismatch */
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
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*ret = cid;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
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{
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/* If only one ID to match then do it */
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if(cid)
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{
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const EVP_MD *dgst;
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X509_NAME *iname;
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int mdlen;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (!(dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm->algorithm)))
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_MATCH_ISSUERID, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return -1;
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}
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mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
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if (mdlen < 0)
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return -1;
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if ((cid->issuerNameHash->length != mdlen) ||
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(cid->issuerKeyHash->length != mdlen))
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return 0;
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iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL))
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return -1;
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if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash->data, mdlen))
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return 0;
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X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL);
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if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash->data, mdlen))
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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else
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{
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/* We have to match the whole lot */
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int i, ret;
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OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++)
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{
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tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
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if (ret <= 0) return ret;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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}
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static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x, int flags)
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{
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X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
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if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) &&
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(x->ex_xkusage & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
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return 1;
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_CHECK_DELEGATED, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Verify an OCSP request. This is fortunately much easier than OCSP
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* response verify. Just find the signers certificate and verify it
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* against a given trust value.
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*/
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int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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X509_NAME *nm;
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GENERAL_NAME *gen;
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int ret;
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X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
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if (!req->optionalSignature)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
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return 0;
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}
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gen = req->tbsRequest->requestorName;
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if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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nm = gen->d.directoryName;
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ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, store, flags);
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if (ret <= 0)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER))
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flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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if (!(flags & OCSP_NOSIGS))
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{
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EVP_PKEY *skey;
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skey = X509_get_pubkey(signer);
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ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
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if(ret <= 0)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!(flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY))
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{
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int init_res;
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if(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN)
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init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, NULL);
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else
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init_res = X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer,
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req->optionalSignature->certs);
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if(!init_res)
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{
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(&ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(&ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
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ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
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X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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if (ret <= 0)
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{
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ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
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OCSPerr(OCSP_F_OCSP_REQUEST_VERIFY,OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
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ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
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X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req, X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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if(!(flags & OCSP_NOINTERN))
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{
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signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
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*psigner = signer;
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return 1;
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}
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signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm);
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if (signer)
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{
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*psigner = signer;
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return 2;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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